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The existence of competition policy forces companies to adjust their behaviour. This is 
also costly. Using a database from a company on contracts, I will try to estimate if a 
specific competition policy disposition, supply contracts cannot be longer than 60 
months, has costs for the coffee suppliers operating in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee 
market. The estimation method used in this paper will be OLS. The results suggest that 
limiting the duration of exclusivity contracts to 60 months can be harmful to the coffee 














According to the International Coffee Organization (ICO) the Portuguese market for 
roasted coffee was worth about two billion Euros in 2009. Although the country is not 
among the largest consumers of coffee in Europe, according to the “Associação 
Industrial e Comercial do Café” (AICC), 80% of the Portuguese population drinks 
coffee, showing that coffee is a very popular drink in Portugal. Looking at the structure 
of the sector, another study, the Kantar WorldPanel, indicates that in 2009 the coffee 
sector was mainly controlled by the coffee manufacturer brands in the coffee sector, 
representing 77% of the total quantity sold in that year. The remaining 23% belong to 
distribution brands. Also, contrary to what happens in most countries in Europe, still 
78% of the coffee consumption happened outside home at the sale point and only 22% 
at home, being this feature transverse to the whole population and constant throughout 
the week. This is why despite of the rise of new forms of consuming coffee, the coffee 
suppliers still invest strongly in the HORECA channel (hotels, restaurants and coffee 
shops). In Portugal the number of establishments (retailers) operating in this channel is 
huge, around 84000, which, as a rule, sell only one coffee brand, either due to a 
voluntary decision or due to the existence of exclusivity contracts. 
In 2006 the Portuguese Competition Authority (CA) has decided to condemn and fine 
one major coffee supplier operating in the Portuguese coffee market for signing 
exclusivity contracts with their retailers that did not impose a limit for the duration of 
the vertical restraint. This practise is forbidden and punished by the Portuguese 
competition law, where, in general, exclusive dealing/contracts are only allowed when 
the market share of the companies does not overcome 30% and the duration1 of these 
                                                 
1 The exclusivity contracts might last longer than 60 months when renewal beyond this limit has the approval of both parties 
involved and there are no obstacles that hinder the retailer from terminating it at the end of the 60 month limit. 
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contracts is limited to 60 months or less. Thus, the CA concluded that the exclusivity 
contracts investigated were restricting the competition in at least part of the national 
coffee market and were therefore illegal. However, from the economic literature we 
know that the use of vertical restraints, like exclusivity contracts, especially in the 
presence specific investments, in business relationships between upstream and 
downstream firms can create positive externalities that increase both the producer (the 
coffee supplier) and the consumer (the retailer) welfare. 
The central goal of the present paper is to show whether the decision of the CA to limit 
the duration of the exclusivity contracts between coffee suppliers and retailers to 60 
months does disturb the correct functioning of the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market, 
whether the Portuguese coffee sector is being penalized by a too strict competition law, 
which may actually undervalue the positive externalities created by the existence of 
exclusivity contracts between coffee suppliers and retailers harming the competition, 
increasing the costs for the firms operating in the coffee market and eventually decrease 
the consumers’ wellbeing. The organization of this paper is the following: Section 2 
presents a literature review, followed by a description of the Portuguese “on-trade” 
coffee market in Section 3. Then, in Section 4 I use data provided by one coffee supplier 
about the “on-trade” coffee market to retrieve some testable hypotheses about which 
variables could influence the duration of the exclusivity contracts. In Section 5, I will 
test these hypotheses and discover which variables might in fact influence the duration 
of an exclusivity contract. I will then test whether the legal imposition of limiting the 
duration of these contracts to 60 months may increase costs to firms and even decrease 
the social welfare. Finally in Section 6 I will conclude by reviewing the basic insights, 
while focusing on possible limitations and further improvements to the analysis. 
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2. Literature review 
In the economic literature about vertical restraints, contractual transactions are often not 
distinguished by the authors from spot-market interactions, leading to empirical 
analyses and conclusions that do not consider the use or effects of specific contract 
clauses. However there are some exceptions. In fact the literature presents three theories 
that are normally used for the study of contractual restrictions. The first one is 
transaction cost economics (TCE), where the work of Oliver Williamson has played a 
major role in the study of contractual clauses that restrict one or both parties in a 
transaction. The second theory used to address this type of problems is the property 
rights theory. The TCE traditionally has emphasized the governance of contractual 
relationships ex post (Williamson, 2002), whereas the assumption of costless bargaining 
in most of the property rights literature has meant that the action occurs ex ante at the 
incentive alignment stage (Whinston, 2003). Finally the last theory used is the agency 
theory (Lafontaine and Slade, 2009, 2010). In several empirical studies the TCE has 
helped explain some aspects of contractual agreements, such as contract duration by 
predicting that the choice of contract terms is influenced by uncertainty, complexity, 
and specificity (Joskow, 1985, 1987; Crocker and Masten, 1988). Williamson (2002) 
states that: “transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance 
structures, which differ in their cost and competencies, in an economizing way.” Thus, 
an important contribution of TCE is that firms’ choices of how to organize their 
transactions are usually based on efficiency enhancing rather than market-power 
strengthening considerations, unless they occur in concentrated markets with strong 
entry barriers (tight oligopolies or dominant firms) (Williamson, 1979). TCE implies 
that contracts will be longer when firms have more specific investments at stake, since 
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the need to protect those investments is greater. They will be shorter, in contrast, when 
environments are more uncertain, since flexibility assumes greater importance in that 
case. Lyons (2002) finds evidence that firms can support specific investments through 
the establishment of partnership agreements, by agreeing to work together in the future, 
or by preferred supplier agreements. However, both imply longer-term relationships. 
This supports again Williamson’s notion of contracting with safeguards, as discussed in 
his 1985 article: “The protective safeguards to which I refer normally take on one or 
more of three forms. The first is to realign incentives, which commonly involves some 
type of severance payment or penalty for premature termination. A second is to create 
and employ a specialized governance structure for referring and resolving disputes. The 
use of arbitration, rather than litigation in the courts, is thus characteristic [….]. A third 
is to introduce trading regularities which support and signal continuity intentions.” 
In modern economies, a very large fraction of retail sales are subject to some form of 
exclusive dealing clauses. New-automobile sales dominate, however other activities, 
such as gasoline, fast food, beer distribution, and business services, are also important. 
Most of the empirical studies that have studied the effects of vertical restraints on the 
consumer welfare are concentrated in these activities (Lafontaine and Slade, 2005). 
Looking at the results of the empirical literature, they support Williamson’s argument 
that contractual constraints often serve legitimate economic purposes. One should not 
stop questioning the use of vertical restraints however one should not presume that they 
are harmful to consumers (Williamson, 1979). However most of these exclusive 
agreements can be grouped under the umbrella of franchising (Slade 2000). This is not 
the case of exclusive dealing in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market, the issue that I 
will address in this paper and that has not yet been handled in the literature. 
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3. The Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market - Economic theory 
The Portuguese coffee sector can be divided in two distinct and independent markets: 
(1) The “on-trade” market and (2) the “off-trade” market2. The main characteristic of 
the “on-trade” coffee market that differentiates it from the “off-trade” coffee market is 
that, in the first one, the demand for coffee drink is normally satisfied by consuming the 
coffee in the place where it was sold. It includes the coffee drink sold in bars, cafeterias, 
restaurants and vending machines (HORECA channel). In Portugal the number of 
establishments operating in this market is huge, around 84000, which, as a rule, sell 
only one coffee brand, either due to a voluntary decision or due to the existence of 
exclusivity contracts. 
From this section on I am only going to consider the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee 
market, in particular the share of the market where retailers operate under an exclusive 
clause. First it is important to describe and identify the characteristics of this market. 
This can be highlighted by a small survey held in 2006 in 25 coffee establishments in 
Lisbon3, where both owners and consumers were interviewed. There are immediately 
two characteristics that emerge: (1) All establishments sell only one brand of coffee; (2) 
they all present brand advertisement in diverse equipments (cups, awnings and so on). It 
was also verified the existence of an almost complete price uniformity, around 0,5 
Euros for a cup of coffee. Moreover the set of 25 establishments were supplied by 10 
different coffee brands. Thus, it seems that the price of a cup of coffee results from a 
competitive environment and consumers choose between the different coffee suppliers 
by choosing the establishment. Therefore we can argue that the existence of supply 
                                                 
2 Definitions used by the European Commission in similar cases. 
3 The survey has been done in the zone de S. Sebastião da Pedreira in Lisbon. The establishments had to 
be located in the same geographical area, within a radius of 1 km/15 minutes walking distance between 
the two establishments further apart. Some of the establishments are located on the same street. 
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exclusivity, either voluntary, or by contract, does not prevent the final consumers from 
having a vast choice of consumption options. Also interesting is the fact that 6 
establishments were open for less than 5 years and that another 6 had a business 
relationship with the current coffee supplier for less than 5 years. Thus almost 50% of 
the establishments considered in the survey had been in the market to choose their 
coffee supplier in the last five years. This can hardly be considered a market where the 
existence of exclusivity contracts lasting more than the 60 months create entry barriers. 
 
This figure shows the capacity of the establishments to change their coffee suppliers. 
Only the establishments over the line have never changed to another supplier, what is 
more likely to happen in more recent establishments. The next table shows the answers 
of the consumers to the questions in the survey. 
Table I: Survey answers 
Question Answer Number 




Do you have a favourite coffee brand? Yes 
77 
No 23 











Source: Author, with information from the survey. 
Source: Author, with information from the survey 
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Looking at the results of the survey, we can state that although the brands are well-
known by the consumers and most of them has even a preferred one, contrary to what 
would be expected, the choice of the local of consumption is driven much more due to 
proximity and opportunity factors than due to brand and investment related factors, 
meaning that although being informed and having preferences, the consumers seem to 
treat coffee as an homogeneous good. The small importance given by the retailer and 
the consumer to the brand name makes the supplier have to spend more on specific 
investments in order to conquer the preference of the retailers. However it is important 
to remember that the sample used in this survey is very small and may not be 
representative. Nevertheless, a broader survey would have the same essential features: 
(1) coffee brand exclusivity, either voluntary or imposed by contract, (2) competition 
between retailer establishments, (3) competition between suppliers and no entry 
barriers, even in the presence of exclusivity contracts, due to entry of new 
establishments or due to changes in suppliers. The last statements can be reinforced by 
looking at the next graph. It shows the Company’s contract evolution, in particular the 
number of exclusivity contracts won and lost in 2005 and 2006, dividing them in three 





































Source: Author, with information from the Company 
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The graph shows two important features. First, behind a relatively stable global market 
share there are important dynamics in terms of winning and losing clients and contracts. 
Second, competition between suppliers is largely present, since losing and winning 
clients to the competition is part of the coffee market activity. Thus, although the 
existence of minimum quantity purchase agreements (with exclusivity clause) can 
reduce the margin of competition by new clients in the market, the dynamics of contract 
creation and termination, means that the reduction of the share of clients without 
exclusivity contracts does not necessarily imply a lack of contract mobility and 
competition in the coffee sector. Each year, a substantial number of clients will be 
active in the market, namely clients without a contract, new clients entering the market 
and clients with a contract that are available for changing supplier (almost 20% each 
year). Therefore it appears that there is no evidence of foreclosure in the coffee market, 
due to the existence of exclusivity contracts with acquisition of a minimum quantity. 
Now it is important to describe how and why exclusivity contracts arise and what do 
they imply for the market. It is important to determine if the exclusivity contracts are 
originated by the needs of demand (clients) or by the market power of supply (coffee 
suppliers). The retailers are normally contacted directly by suppliers’ representatives. 
However larger retailers choose their coffee suppliers through auction processes, where 
the potential suppliers present their contract portfolios. The contracts are based on an 
economic model where the key element is the requirement to purchase a minimum 
quantity associated to an exclusivity clause, where the contract duration is seen as a 
nonessential aspect, being adjustable, if necessary, until the total quantity of acquired 
coffee is reached. In turn, as part of the exclusivity contract, the retailers receive on the 
other hand specific investments done by the supplier, which may include advertisement, 
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machines, equipment, know how and technical support. These investments are 
sometimes crucial for the improvement of the retailers’ establishments and without 
them some retailers would not even enter the market4. Thus, for a proper understanding 
of the functioning of the market it is crucial to know the negotiating process that 
determines the minimum quantity. The determination of the quantity in the contract 
depends on several factors: i) clients have an incentive to predict future consumption 
levels above the actual consumption, when they feel an association between the rate of 
specific investments, equipment and provision of complementary services, and the 
amount of coffee contracted; ii) the suppliers have an interest to overvalue the demand 
as a way to sell more, since the commercial agents are awarded according to the sales 
they make. Since the quantity acquired by the clients depends on their realized 
consumption levels, the adjustment of the contract duration exists in both directions, 
either in the anticipation of the contract end if the stipulated quantity has been acquired 
more quickly than what was expected, either in the extension of the contract duration if 
the stipulated quantity is not being acquired at the expected rate. Thus, the concern 
underlying the use of contracts is not to hold clients during the period of time in which 
the contract is active, but to allow the suppliers to recover the specific investments made 
through the sale of the agreed quantity of coffee. The payments made by the client to 
the supplier should cover: i) the cost of acquired coffee for consumption; ii) the value of 
specific investments made by the supplier. When there is uncertainty about the quantity 
of coffee sold at each moment in the coffee shops, the way to ensure the return of the 
specific investment, is to ensure that the required quantity is in fact sold, thus allowing 
the contract duration to vary. 
                                                 
4 The specific investments help the owners of the establishments to avoid having to finance their activity 
through bank loans. 
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Exclusivity contracts are vertical restraints. In general these restraints are agreements 
between vertically related firms, which may be aimed at reducing transactions costs, 
guaranteeing availability and security of supply, and to solve coordination problems. 
Different types of vertical restraints may have different impacts on welfare depending 
typically on whether they are intra-brand5 or inter-brand. In the Portuguese “on-trade” 
coffee market both types of competition are present. Vertical restraints affecting intra-
brand competition allow, in general, a better coordination of the vertical chain and do 
not harm competition. As to inter-brand competition, vertical restrictions may raise the 
costs of rivals and lead to market foreclosure. 
Thus, exclusive dealing may exist due to efficiency reasons or due to anti-competitive 
reasons. Let’s start by pointing out important efficiency reasons for using this type of 
vertical restraint. Suppliers doing specific investments in their clients/retailers 
establishments, like improving the sale point, promoting retail products, investing in 
equipment or training the staff to work with the coffee machine may worry that retailers 
will free ride on those investments by switching to a competing coffee supplier with a 
higher retail profit margin. In this case the use of exclusivity contracts enables the 
supplier to protect its investments against potential retailer opportunism. Furthermore, 
in its absence, potentially profitable investments might not be undertaken. Now, on the 
other hand let’s point out anticompetitive reasons. Exclusive dealing can inhibit entry of 
new coffee suppliers in the market. This is the main worry of competition authorities in 
the U.S. and the E.U. when it comes to vertical restraints. If the coffee suppliers 
establish exclusivity contracts with most retailers in the market, they might either 
prevent potential competitors from gaining access to the clients, in this case the owners 
                                                 
5 There is intra-brand competition since retailers selling the same coffee brand compete between them. 
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of the establishments, at a reasonable cost, or even lead to the exit of rivals from the 
upstream market industry (suppliers) (see, e.g., Krattenmaker and Salop (1986), Aghion 
and Bolton (1987) and Comanor and Rey (2000)). As I have shown throughout this 
section, there seems not to be market foreclosure in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee 
market. In the end, if the exclusivity contracts were used to lessen competition at some 
level of the vertical chain through foreclosing or disadvantaging rivals, the prices to 
consumers should be higher and quantities sold smaller than in the absence of such 
restraints and this seems not to be the case in the Portuguese “on-trade” coffee market. 
Limiting exclusive contracts duration in the “on-trade” coffee market to a maximum of 
60 months may have a negative impact on the well-being of coffee suppliers and 
consumers and as such on the social welfare. In order to understand how social welfare 
is affected by this measure it is necessary to identify the potential effects that it has on 













4. Descriptive statistics 
In order to see if the market functioning might be seriously affected by the time 
constraint imposed to the exclusive contracts duration we have to look first at some 
descriptive statistics from the “on-trade” coffee market. In this section I am going to 
look at data provided by one of the main coffee suppliers in the “on-trade” coffee 
market (called from now on the Company). My main focus will be the data related to 
business relationships were exclusivity contracts are active. Although not dominant, this 
supplier has a market share between 20% and 25% and is therefore a representative 
supplier for the whole “on-trade” coffee market. Most of the available data concerns the 
period between 2000 and 2004.  
4.1 Global analysis: 
Table II: Exclusivity contract global analysis 
  
Total 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Contracts 6858 8765 10675 12523 14169 
Monthly kg/contract  45,57 kg 43,33 kg 46,77 kg 51,36 kg 50,40 kg 
Average duration 56,88 mth 56,20 mth 55,66 mth 55,52 mth 55,61 mth 
Investments/contract 3342,70€ 3528,06€ 3596,16€ 3824,68€ 4191,11€ 
Investments/kg 6,11€ 6,79€ 6,41€ 6,21€ 6,93€ 
 
According to table I, between 2000 and 2004, the number of exclusivity contracts 
signed by the Company has increased. In this period the number of exclusivity contracts 
has more than doubled, rising from only 6858 exclusivity contracts (5606 clients6) in 
2000 to 14169 (10917 clients) in 2004. Since the total number of clients held by the 
Company was in this period almost constant, this means that the percentage of clients 
with exclusivity contracts has increased from 27% in 2000 to 53% in 2004. In the same 
period the monthly quantity of coffee acquired per contract has also increased, from 
                                                 
6 A client may have more than one exclusivity contract. 
Source: Author, with information from the Company 
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45,57 kg per contract to 50,4 kg per contract. However, the average duration of the 
exclusivity contracts has remained more or less constant between 55 and 56 months. It 
is also important to look at the behaviour of the specific investments done by the 
Company in the retailers’ sale points (HORECA channel). In fact, in the period under 
analyse the variables of investments per contract and investments per kg also increased. 
Between 2000 and 2004 there was a 25% increase in the suppliers investments per 
contract (3342,70 Euros  4191,11 Euros) and a 13% increase in the suppliers 
investments per kilo of coffee (6,11 Euros  6,93 Euros). 
Table III: Evolution of exclusivity contract duration between 2000 and 2004 
Number of contracts 
lasting 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Less than 60 months7 2203 32,12% 2911 33,21% 3670 34,38% 4159 33,21% 4527 31,95%
60 months or less 3913 57,06% 5163 58,90% 6417 60,11% 7726 61,69% 8900 62,81%
60 months 6116 89,18% 8074 92,12% 10087 94,49% 11885 94,91% 13427 94,76%
More than 60 months 742 10,82% 691 7,88% 588 5,51% 638 5,09% 742 5,24% 
Total 6858 100% 8765 100% 10675 100% 12523 100% 14169 100% 
 
In the table above, the exclusivity contracts were divided in four groups according to 
their duration. It is interesting to notice that most of the exclusivity contracts last exactly 
60 months and that in 2004 only 5,24% of them lasted longer than 60 months, half of 
the value registered in 2000. Thus, looking at the table, we see that the increase in the 
number of contracts lasting 60 months or less is entirely responsible for the overall 
growth in the number of exclusivity contracts registered between 2000 and 2004. 
4.2 Comparison analysis: 
Now the exclusivity contracts will be grouped according to their duration. Thus, there 
will be two groups: (1) contracts with duration equal to 60 months or less, (2) contracts 
lasting longer than 60 months. 
                                                 
7 Between 2000 and 2004 the average duration of contracts lasting 60 months or less was almost constant 
over 54 months, meaning a concentration of exclusivity contracts near the 60 months duration limit. 
Source: Author, with information from the Company 
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Table IV: Comparison and evolution of key variables in contracts above and under the limit 
60 months 
or less 
Year More than 
60 months 
Year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Contracts 6116 8074 10087 11885 13427 Contracts 742 691 588 638 742 
100% 132,01% 164,93% 194,33% 219,54% 100% 93,13% 79,25% 85,98% 100% 
 132,01% 124,93% 117,82% 112,97%  93,13% 85,09% 108,50% 116,30%
Monthly 
kg/contract 
44,41 42,57 46,43 51,25 50,26 Monthly 
kg/contract 
55,15 52,17 52,67 53,50 52,91 
100% 95,85% 104,55% 115,40% 113,18% 100% 94,59% 95,50% 97,01% 95,94% 
 95,85% 109,07% 110,38% 98,08%  94,59% 100,96% 101,58% 98,90% 
Average 
duration 
54,38 54,46 54,35 54,34 54,46 Average 
duration 
77,45 76,53 78,10 77,61 76,47 
100% 100,15% 99,93% 99,92% 100,15% 100% 98,81% 100,85% 100,21% 98,74% 
 100,15% 99,78% 99,98% 100,23%  98,81% 102,06% 99,36% 98,54% 
Investments/ 
contract 
3010,57 3210,45 3290,51 3513,37 3872,32 Investments/ 
contract 
6080,30 7239,18 8839,36 9624,05 9959,89 
100% 106,64% 109,30% 116,70% 128,62% 100% 119,06% 145,38% 158,28% 163,81%
 106,64% 102,49% 106,77% 110,22%  119,06% 122,10% 108,88% 103,49%
Investments/ 
kg 
5,65 6,29 5,91 5,71 6,42 Investments/ 
kg 
9,19 11,56 13,98 14,99 15,69 
100% 111,33% 104,60% 101,06% 113,63% 100% 125,79% 152,12% 163,11% 170,73%
 111,33% 93,96% 96,62% 112,43%  125,79% 120,93% 107,22% 104,67%
 
Looking at the table we can verify an approximation of the monthly average quantity of 
coffee acquired per exclusivity contract in the two groups. Between 2000 and 2004 
there was an increase of 13% in the value of this variable in exclusivity contracts lasting 
60 months or less. On the other hand, over the same period, this same variable 
decreased 4% in exclusivity contracts lasting more than 60 months. Another important 
variable to look at is the average duration of the exclusivity contracts that exceed 60 
months. It should be noted that the value of this variable has been more or less constant 
over 76 months, a value significantly above the duration limit of 60 months. Finally, 
comparing the two groups, it is easy to observe that either the investments per contract, 
either the investments per kg, are significantly higher in the contracts lasting more than 
60 months. Although the values of these variables in both groups have generally 
increased over the years, the gap between them has been increasing, since the value of 
the specific investments made by the supplier per contract and per kg is growing faster 
in contracts lasting more than 60 months. This may mean that the duration of an 
Source: Author, with data from the Company; second line – variation since 2000; third line – year to year variation 
16 
 
exclusivity contract is in fact an important variable to ensure the return of the specific 
investments made by the supplier, since it enables him to share the investment risk with 
the retailer, by giving enough time for the supplier to recover the specific investment 
made, important when investments per contract and per kg are significant. 
1st test hypothesis: The level of specific investment per contract and per kg may 
influence the exclusivity contract duration. 
4.3 First time contracts versus not first time contracts: 
The next table shows that exclusivity contracts signed for the first time account for 
almost one-sixth of the total number of exclusivity contracts existing in 2004 and tend 
to have a higher duration. However this does not mean that a higher percentage of this 
type of contracts lasts more than 60 months. Indeed the percentage of exclusivity 
contracts signed for more than 60 months in 2004 is almost the same, around 6%, in the 
two groups considered in the table. But more important is the fact that almost three 
quarters of first time contracts are signed for a period of exactly 60 months. 
Table V: Comparison of the number of exclusivity contracts distributed by duration 
1º Contract Number     Not 1º Contract Number   
Duration (<60) 199 20,69%   Duration (<60) 1544 31,45% 
Duration (60) 706 73,39%   Duration (60) 3060 62,32% 
Duration (>60) 57 5,93%   Duration (>60) 306 6,23% 
Sum 962 100,00%   Sum 4910 100,00% 
2nd test hypothesis: Year in which exclusivity contract was sign influences its duration 
The next table shows the average value per contract of several determinant variables. 
Again, there is evidence that the average duration of contracts in new business 
relationships tend to last less, in all duration categories. Moreover, due to the high level 
of competition in the coffee supply market, it is interesting to verify that in 2004, the 
average price per kilo of coffee for retailers signing an exclusivity contract for the first 
Source: Author, with information from the Company; Data from 2004. 
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time was only around 10% higher if the contract duration was above 60 months 
compared to the case where the contract lasts 60 months (lowest value in this variable). 
This small price difference is, although higher, still small in contracts of older business 
relationships. In this case the average price per kilo differs 13,6%. However the same 
pattern is not verified in the average value of specific investments per kilo. In this case 
the average cost per kilo of coffee is proportional to the contract duration. Also, 
contracts sign for the first time have on average higher investment costs per kilo of 
coffee. This happens due to the lower quantity of coffee sold per contract and due to the 
higher value of the specific investments done in first time exclusivity contracts. Finally 
it is easy to conclude that the average net price, the financial gain of the exclusivity 
contract for the supplier, is much lower in contracts sign for the first time. 
Table VI: Comparison of key variables in contracts above, under and on the limit 
1º Contract 
Duration   Not 1º 
Contract 
Duration 
<60 60 >60   <60 60 >60 
Duration 41,66 60,00 70,16   Duration 44,85 60,00 75,63 
 NPS  3.923,57 5.715,60 6.666,16    NPS  6.287,07 6.225,69 9.867,21 
Volume 258,25 392,95 418,79   Volume 469,97 419,12 649,11 
Inv. Cost 3.433,44 6.611,40 11.422,06   Inv. Cost 2.431,17 4.870,54 11.377,07 
Price/kg 15,19 14,55 15,92   Price/kg 13,38 14,85 15,20 
Cost/kg 13,30 16,83 27,27   Cost/kg 5,17 11,62 17,53 
Net price 1,90 -2,28 -11,36   Net price 8,20 3,23 -2,33 
 
3rd test hypothesis: First time contracts may increase the exclusivity contract duration. 
4.4 Specific investment analysis 
The tables used in this section are in annex 1. According to the information in table 
XIII, more than half of the value spent by suppliers in specific investments goes to 
advertisement cost sharing. Also interesting is the fact that suppliers tend to borrow 
equipment rather than selling it (30% versus 5%), preferring in both cases the use of 
new equipment (29% versus 6%). When supplier and retailer are bounded by an 
exclusivity contract the risk of free-riding is much lower. Reinforcing this statement is 
Source: Author, with information from the Company; Data from 2004. 
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the fact that the third component where suppliers allocate more investment is in sale 
point material (13%). Looking at table XIV it is important to keep in mind that the 
quantity of coffee acquired is lower in exclusivity contracts signed for the first time than 
in older business relationships. Thus, table XIV shows that, as mentioned before, 
specific investments are on average significantly higher in contracts sign with new 
clients. Dividing the specific investment according to the exclusivity contracts duration, 
we see that in contracts lasting more than 60 months the investment in advertisement is 
much higher than in contracts with duration equal to or less than 60 months. Moreover, 
in new contracts, this behaviour is also true for other components of investment like 
borrowed equipment and sale point material. Finally it is also interesting to observe that 
almost all specific investment done through sold equipment by suppliers is allocated to 
exclusivity contracts lasting less than 60 months. This may be explained, due to the 
negative relation that exists between contract duration and supplier investment risk.  
4th test hypothesis: The level of investment spent on advertisement and borrowed 
equipment may influence the exclusivity contract duration. 
5. Model 
In this section I am going to construct an empirical model that allows me to: (1) test 
whether the four hypotheses derived from the descriptive statistical analysis done in the 
previous section do in fact influence the duration of an exclusivity contract; (2) see if 
the determinant factors and their magnitudes are different according to whether the 
duration of the exclusivity contract is above or below 60 months; (3) test whether 
limiting the exclusivity contract duration to 60 months has costs for the firms. For this 
purpose I will use two separate regressions, one for the first two points and another for 
the last one. The estimation process used in both regressions will be the ordinary least 
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square (OLS) method (Sass (2005)), being individual statistical significance tests based 
on robust standard deviations to allow for heteroskedasticity. All the information used 
to estimate the parameters has been provided by the company. The data used in the 
regressions is from 2004, the last year with available information. The first regression used in 
this section will be aimed at analysing which variables are relevant for determining the 
duration of an exclusivity contract. Thus, the regression is the following:  
2
 
The dependent variable in this regression is the duration of the exclusivity contracts and 
its value is given in months. Since the estimation method used, is OLS, the estimated 
constant term will represent the expected arithmetic mean of the exclusivity contract 
duration when all other variables are equal to zero. A one unit increase in one of the 
explanatory variables represents a variation of  months in the contract duration. The 
results of the regression are presented in the next table: 
Table VII: OLS estimation results 
Variables: 
Dependent variable: Duration 
All 
More than 60 
months 
Equal to or less 
than 60 months 
59,86 88,9 55,88 
1º contract 1,9 4 0,81 
Year -0,58 -2,05 -0,28 
Volume -0,003 -0,013* -0,0009* 
Volume2 -1,8e^-10* -1,22e^-6 2,27e^-9* 
Average net price 0,09 0,57* 0,024* 
Investment costs 0,0005 0,001 0,0002 
Advertisement/kg 0,44 0,034* 1.34 
Sold  
equipment 
New/kg -1,93 -4,56 -1,46 
Used/kg -4,08 - -3,56 
Borrowed 
equipment 
New/kg 1,45 0,36* 2,56 
Used/kg -2,87 -1,06* -2,43 
Sale point equipment/kg -0,06* 0,06* 0,02* 
Observations 5592 322 5270 
 0,173 0,101 0,193 2R
Source: Author, based in information provided by the Company; * Parameter is not statistically 
significant; - Omitted because of collinearity. 
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The Goodness of fit of the regressions is low, since in all three cases the R-squared 
value is below 20%8. The estimated value of the constant term in all three regressions 
shows what the data had already predicted in the previous section. The expected average 
duration of contracts lasting more than 60 months is well above the limit. The variable 
"dcontract" is a dummy variable, assuming the value one when an exclusivity contract 
has been signed for the first time and the value zero otherwise. It has a positive effect on 
the contract duration, meaning that contract signed for the first time may eventually 
increase the contract duration. This effect is even more important in the exclusivity 
contracts lasting more than 60 months. The variable "Volume" represents the minimum 
quantity of coffee acquired during the duration of the exclusivity contract and 
"Volume2" is the square of the previous variable and is used to capture the existence of 
non-linearity relations9. These variables are economically insignificant. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the acquisition of a greater or lesser quantity of coffee does not have a 
clear influence in the determination of the duration of the exclusivity contract. The 
variable "Year" corresponds to the year when the contract has been signed. Having a 
negative effect on the contract duration means that everything else constant more recent 
exclusivity contracts have had a shorter duration. However, this effect is only 
economically significant for exclusivity contracts lasting more than 60 months. This 
means that over the years the duration of the contracts lasting longer has been 
decreasing and the duration of the contracts lasting 60 months or less has been almost 
constant. The variable "avgnetPrice". The variable “Invcosts” represents the specific 
investments done during the duration of a given exclusivity contract. Although 
statistically significant, its economic value is ridiculous. Thus, to capture the effect of 
                                                 
8 The value of R2 is interpreted as the fraction of the dependent variable explained by the regression. 
9 The nonlinear transformation increases the linear relationship between the variables. 
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specific investments on the contract duration, other variables are needed, "Advertkg", 
"SoldEqNewkg", "SoldEqUsedkg", "BorrowEqNewkg", "BorrowEqUsedkg", "SPEkg", 
which were included in relative terms to the total minimum quantity to be acquired 
under the contract. In the case of advertisement per kg of coffee, there is a positive 
effect which is statistically significant in the samples that consider all exclusivity 
contracts or only contracts lasting 60 months or less. This indicates that, all else 
constant, the contracts with more investment in advertisement per kg of coffee tend to 
last longer. This is a natural effect, given that it is necessary, for the same amount of 
coffee sold, more time to recover the realized investment. On the other hand, an 
increase in the investment in sold equipment, either new or used, leads in general to a 
decrease in the duration of the contract. This may be explained by the increased risk 
involved, leading to a desire of more rapidly recover the investment made. Finally, 
according to the results presented in the table, the investment in sale point equipment is 
not statistically significant in all samples considered. Thus, it seems that the contract 
duration has been reduced over the last years, particularly in contracts that last longer, 
that the quantity sold shows no relationship with the contract duration and that the 
specific investments lead generally to a shorter duration, possibly capturing risk effects 
that are not explained by the other variables. The determinant factors and their 
magnitudes are different according to the duration of the exclusivity contract is above or 
below 60 months. 
After looking at the variables that affect duration, it is time to evaluate if the policy of 
restricting the duration limit of exclusivity contracts bares costs to the upstream market, 
in this case the coffee suppliers. The first step to evaluate this impact is to discover what 
value has exclusivity contracts for the coffee suppliers. Since the available data does not 
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give directly that information there is the need to use proxies. The net price per Kg will 
be used as proxy for the contract value for the coffee suppliers. It represents the 
difference between the price paid by a retailer per kg of coffee and the value of specific 
investment received by him10. This proxy has however some limitations, since it does 
not capture the suppliers gains with positive externalities created by specific 
investments made in retailers establishments: 1) Improvement of suppliers image; 2) 
Service externality, which means that other retailers, with or without exclusivity 
contract, selling the same brand will benefit from the improvement in quality and 
image; 3) Security of supply (Lower risk). The suppliers can better predict the quantity 
of coffee they will sell in a given year. Now, we can evaluate the costs for the coffee 
suppliers of limiting the duration of exclusivity contracts. First let’s start the analysis by 
doing a price significance test: 
Table VIII: Data for significance test   Table IX: Price significance test 
2004: Duration(≤60) (1), Duration(>60) (2) 






Number of contracts 
n1 5509 
n2 363 
Source: Author     Source: Author 
The price significance test shows that the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that the 
net prices are different when the exclusivity contracts last more than 60 months. The 
value of the contracts for the suppliers is affected by their duration. To analyse this and 





2 60 60  
                                                 
10 The variable "avgnetPrice" represents the financial gain of an exclusivity contract for the supplier. 
2004 Net price       
Duration(≤60) x1 4,09 -180,50%   
Duration(>60) x2 -3,29
  s1 53,41 n1 5509 
0,06 
  s2 28,07 n2 363 
  
4,51 Reject the null hypotheses that 





Where “netprice” is the dependent variable and stands for the net price per kg of coffee 
of each contract. The value of this variable is given in Euros. The estimation method is 
again OLS, thus the way how to interpret the parameters is the same as before. The 
parameters  reflect the effect of each variable in the contract net price, while the 
parameters  describe the additional effect if the contract duration is equal to 60 month. 
The sign of the parameters  and  linked to the variables  and 2 will 
depend on the existence of quantity discounts. This means that in the presence of 
discounts it is expected that the parameters bound to these variables are negative, which 
would mean that a higher amount of coffee involved in the contract, lowers the final 
price. The results of the regression are observed in the next table: 
Table X: OLS estimation results 
Variables: 
Dependent variable: Net price 
2,01 
1º contract -0,32 
Volume 0,03 
Volume2 -7,51e^-9* 
Investment costs -0,002 







Source: Author, based in information provided by the Company; 
* Parameter is not statistically significant. 
The variables “dcontract”, “Volume”, “Volume2” and “InvCosts” are the same as in 
the first regression. The variable “ddurmore60” is also a dummy variable stating 
whether an exclusivity contract lasts more than 60 month (1) or not (0). The variables 




“ddurmore60”. The regression gives us some interesting results. First of all it is 
interesting to notice the fact that retailers signing exclusivity contracts with the supplier 
for the first time have a negative impact over the net price, meaning that exclusivity 
contracts sign for the first time have less value for the supplier than contract relations 
that are renovated. This may have to do with the need to spend more in specific 
investments in new business relations. The next graph supports this last statement: 
Graph III: Evolution of average price, cost and net price per kg of coffee 
 
As we can see in the graph above, the average price (per kg of coffee) of exclusivity 
contracts does not seem to be influenced by the antiquity of the business relation. The 
same is not true for average costs incurred by the supplier with specific investments. 
The graph shows that although the average costs of the contracts have been increasing 
between 2001 and 2004, the amount of specific investment spend by the supplier with 
new clients is much higher. Thus the average net price, the value of exclusivity 
contracts for the supplier, is much lower in new contracts. In 2004 this value was even 
negative, meaning that the average cost per kilo of coffee in new contracts was higher 
than the average price per kilo of coffee paid by the retailers to their supplier. The next 





















Source: Author, based in information provided by the Company 
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Table XI: Information for significance test   Table XII: Price significance test 
2004: Not 1º Contract (1), 1º Contract (2) 






Number of contracts 
n1 4910 
n2 962 
Source: Author     Source: Author 
Thus, the price significance test shows that the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that 
the net price is different (lower) in exclusivity contracts sign for the first time. 
The variable Volume has to be analysed very carefully, since there could be some 
endogeneity between the variable Volume and InvCosts. The variable InvCosts has been 
calculated by dividing the investment made by the variable Volume. As expected the 
investment has a negative impact over the net price and the quantity contracted has a 
positive effect. However these variables have are economically significant, but that does 
not mean that there cannot be quantity discounts. We have to look at the marginal price. 
If it decreases when the quantity increases then there are quantity discounts. Finally the 
fact that exclusivity contracts have a duration that exceeds the legal limit of 60 months 
has a negative impact over the net price (ddurmore60 = -1,2). Also interesting is the 
sign of the variable that combines first time contracts that last more than 60 months. 
The value of the parameter is 0,52, meaning that exclusivity contracts signed for the 
first time and that last more than 60 months increase the value of the suppliers. These 
last two statements are very important, because they prove that the duration of the 
exclusivity contracts is determined by the needs of demand (clients/retailers), since the 
need for higher specific investments makes it necessary a longer period for the supplier 
to recover the investments made. This happens especially with new clients. 
 
2004 Net price       
Not 1º contract x1 4,37 -152%   
1º Contract x2 -2,29
  s1 47,80 n1 4910 
0,16 
  s2 71,89 n2 962 
  
2,75 Reject the null hypotheses that 




After the statistical analysis done in section 4 and after the empirical analysis done in 
section 5, it is clear that limiting the duration of the exclusivity contracts to 60 months 
has costs for the coffee suppliers. As it has been shown, the number of exclusivity 
contracts lasting more than 60 months is small and over the years their duration and 
number has been declining. Thus, as it has been concluded in the previous section, the 
duration of the exclusivity contracts is determined by the needs of demand 
(clients/retailers), since the need for higher specific investments increases the necessary 
time for the supplier to recover the value spent on specific investments. This happens 
especially with new clients, which normally need more investments in advertisement 
and equipment. It is at this point that the importance of the minimum quantity 
acquisition clause plays an important role in recovering the investment made. The 
quantity of coffee acquired by the retailers over the period that the contract is active will 
depend on the level of specific investments received and on the expected demand11. 
Thus exclusivity contracts that exceed 60 months are contracts where the minimum 
quantity of coffee acquired by the retailer is either above the realized demand for coffee 
in the period where the exclusivity contract is active, or used to recover specific 
investment. With the imposition of the CA to limit the duration of the exclusivity 
contract to 60 months, if the clients want to continue to benefit from specific 
investments made by the suppliers, the suppliers would have to establish fixed 
quantities to be sold in each period of the exclusivity contract, so that at the end of its 
duration the minimum quantity specified in the contract would actually have been 
acquired and the investments recovered. Thus the amount of coffee purchased by the 
                                                 
11 Not realized demand, since the clause is signed at the beginning of the contract 
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retailers would have to be independent of consumption levels. This means that the 
clients would have to bear most of the risk and costs associated with demand 
fluctuations, which eventually would lead to market exit by some retailers decreasing 
the suppliers’ sales volume, both in value and in quantity. This would not occur if the 
demand uncertainty risk would be shared between suppliers and clients through the 
possibility of automatically extend the contracts duration beyond five years. 
Alternatively, if the clients are the ones to bear all the uncertainty risk of the 
consumption level, then they try to protect themselves from possible costs associated 
with over estimation. Thus they start to be more cautious regarding forecasts of 
expected consumption levels, leading to a decrease in the quantities of coffee sold by 
the suppliers. The reduction of coffee shops competing in the market decreases the 
number of existing contracts between suppliers and retailers, decreasing therefore also 
the quantity of coffee sold. Finally the suppliers brand image could also be negatively 
affected, since with the reduction in specific investments, the atmosphere and the 
service quality in the establishments would deteriorate. Limiting the contract duration to 
five years may also have costs for the final consumers, since they are adversely affected 
by the reduction of coffee shops and by the increase in the coffee price, consequence of 
less competition in the retail market. From the above follows that the market 
functioning might be seriously affected by the time constraint imposed to the exclusive 
contracts duration. 
However, further research should be done on this issue, especially with more recent and 
complete databases in order to compare the market behaviour before and after the limit 
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Annex 1: Specific investments 
Table XIII: Specific investment components in total value and per contract 
All Total Contract  
Advertisement 14.799.996,84 2.520,44 52,59% 
Sold equip. (New) 1.125.492,50 191,67 4,00% 
Sold equip. (Used) 183.632,31 31,27 0,65% 
Equip. on loan (New) 6.943.710,02 1.182,51 24,67% 
Equip. on loan (Used) 1.422.514,61 242,25 5,05% 
MPV 3.665.576,96 624,25 13,03% 
Sum 28.140.923,24 4.792,39 100,00% 
Table XIV: Specific investment components in first time contracts 
1º Contract Total Contract   Not 1º Contract Total Contract   
Advertisement 3.454.848,43 3.591,32 57,56% 23,34% Advertisement 11.345.148,41 2.310,62 51,25% 76,66% 
Sold equip. (New) 64.150,32 66,68 1,07% 5,70% Sold equip. (New) 1.061.342,18 216,16 4,79% 94,30% 
Sold equip. (Used) 12.756,73 13,26 0,21% 6,95% Sold equip. (Used) 170.875,58 34,8 0,77% 93,05% 
Equip. on loan (New) 1.271.202,82 1.321,42 21,18% 18,31% Equip. on loan (New) 5.672.507,20 1.155,30 25,62% 81,69% 
Equip. on loan (Used) 396.661,23 412,33 6,61% 27,88% Equip. on loan (Used) 1.025.853,38 208,93 4,63% 72,12% 
MPV 802.342,33 834,04 13,37% 21,89% MPV 2.863.234,63 583,14 12,93% 78,11% 
Sum 6.001.961,86 6.239,05 100,00% 21,33% Sum 22.138.961,38 4.508,95 100,00% 78,67% 
          
1º Contract, 
Dur.(<60) Total Contract   
Not 1º Contract, 
Dur.(<60) Total Contract   
Advertisement 247.539,06 1.243,91 36,23% 7,16% Advertisement 856.796,40 554,92 22,83% 7,55% 
Sold equip. (New) 61.678,02 309,94 9,03% 96,15% Sold equip. (New) 1.051.603,16 681,09 28,01% 99,08% 
Sold equip. (Used) 12.756,73 64,1 1,87% 100,00% Sold equip. (Used) 170.875,58 110,67 4,55% 100,00%
Equip. on loan (New) 59.883,00 300,92 8,76% 4,71% Equip. on loan (New) 691.831,57 448,08 18,43% 12,20% 
Equip. on loan (Used) 169.802,06 853,28 24,85% 42,81% Equip. on loan (Used) 532.251,82 344,72 14,18% 51,88% 
MPV 131.594,97 661,28 19,26% 16,40% MPV 450.374,46 291,69 12,00% 15,73% 
Sum 683.253,84 3.433,43 100,00% 11,38% Sum 3.753.732,99 2.431,17 100,00% 16,96% 
          
1º Contract, Dur.(60) Total Contract   Not 1º Contract, Dur.(60) Total Contract   
Advertisement 2.752.848,13 3.899,22 58,98% 79,68% Advertisement 7.755.359,94 2.534,43 52,04% 68,36% 
Sold equip. (New) 0 0 0,00% 0,00% Sold equip. (New) 1.346,75 0,44 0,01% 0,13% 
Sold equip. (Used) 0 0 0,00% 0,00% Sold equip. (Used) 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 
Equip. on loan (New) 1.116.050,41 1.580,81 23,91% 87,79% Equip. on loan (New) 4.514.871,88 1.475,45 30,29% 79,59% 
Equip. on loan (Used) 198.077,32 280,56 4,24% 49,94% Equip. on loan (Used) 407.116,34 133,04 2,73% 39,69% 
MPV 600.674,59 850,81 12,87% 74,87% MPV 2.225.150,71 727,17 14,93% 77,71% 
Sum 4.667.650,45 6.611,40 100,00% 77,77% Sum 14.903.845,62 4.870,53 100,00% 67,32% 
          
1º Contract, 
Dur.(>60) Total Contract   
Not 1º Contract, 
Dur.(>60) Total Contract   
Advertisement 454.461,24 7.973,00 69,80% 13,15% Advertisement 2.732.992,07 8.931,35 78,50% 24,09% 
Sold equip. (New) 2.472,30 43,37 0,38% 3,85% Sold equip. (New) 8.392,27 27,43 0,24% 0,79% 
Sold equip. (Used) 0 0 0,00% 0,00% Sold equip. (Used) 0 0 0,00% 0,00% 
Equip. on loan (New) 95.269,41 1.671,39 14,63% 7,49% Equip. on loan (New) 465.803,75 1.522,23 13,38% 8,21% 
Equip. on loan (Used) 28.781,85 504,94 4,42% 7,26% Equip. on loan (Used) 86.485,22 282,63 2,48% 8,43% 
MPV 70.072,77 1.229,35 10,76% 8,73% MPV 187.709,46 613,43 5,39% 6,56% 
Sum 651.057,57 11.422,05 100,00% 10,85% Sum 3.481.382,77 11.377,07 100,00% 15,73% 
 Source: Author, with information from the Company; Data from 2004. 
Source: Author, with information from the Company; Data from 2004. 
